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This paper examines the impacts of electoral reforms and the Arab Spring on the activities 
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electoral reforms in 2006, the ICM lost some of its seats. However, it gained seats in the 
February 2012 election. Focusing on the structure of political competition in Kuwait, we 
analyse the reasons for this volatility.  
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Abstract:  
 
This paper examines the impacts of electoral reforms and the Arab Spring on the activities 
of the Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait. The Islamic Constitutional Movement (ICM), its 
political wing, has been participating in parliamentary elections since 1991. As a result of 
electoral reforms in 2006, the ICM lost some of its seats. However, it gained seats in the 
February 2012 election. Focusing on the structure of political competition in Kuwait, we 
analyse the reasons for this volatility.  
 
Introduction 
 
As an example of Islamist political participation, the activities of the Islamic 
Constitutional Movement (ICM; Arabic: al-Ḥarakah al-Dustūriyyah al-Islāmiyyah) in 
Kuwait are examined. The ICM is the political wing of the Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood. 
It was established in 1991, soon after Kuwait’s liberation from Iraqi occupation. The ICM 
is well organised and acts as a de facto political party, although political parties have not 
been legalised in Kuwait.  
 
Having participated in parliamentary elections since 1992, the ICM has occupied a 
leading position within the Islamic bloc and the opposition, and led the electoral reform 
in 2006. In the 2006 election, which focused on the issue of electoral reform, they won 
six seats, the highest number ever won by the party. Following the revision of election 
laws, the ICM prepared a bill to legalise political parties and evolve the Islamic bloc into 
a parliamentary party. At that time, observers foresaw the beginning of party politics in 
4 
Kuwait.1 
  
However, the ICM lost seats in the 2008 election, which was held under the new electoral 
system. After the 2009 election, it retained only one seat despite fielding new candidates. 
Subsequently, the ICM exhibited an evident decline in its influence and faced uncertainty 
regarding the future prospects of its leadership and representation. However, in the 
February 2012 election, it successfully recovered and, with affiliated Islamist members 
of parliament (MPs), formed a majority against the ruling family–led cabinet, urging 
revisions to the Constitution and the parliamentary cabinet system. In June 2012, the 
Constitutional Court ruled that these measures were unconstitutional and ordered the 
dissolution of parliament. Since that time, the ICM and a number of former MPs have 
been boycotting electoral polls. 
 
Observers have analysed the ICM from three perspectives. The first focuses on the ICM 
itself, arguing in terms of the progress of democratisation, wherein the ICM is regarded 
as an example of a pragmatic and liberalised Islamic party that is succeeding in achieving 
legitimate participation.2 The second focuses on the relation between the ICM and the 
Kuwaiti regime, arguing that it aids in maintaining authoritarianism by acceding to co-
optation and divided government rule.3 The third focuses on external influences, such as 
the regional influence of political Islamism and the Muslim Brotherhood due to its 
synchronised wins in elections held soon after the Arab Spring.4 These three perspectives 
seem to have some explanatory power. However, they cannot explain the defeat of the 
                                               
1 Nathan J. Brown, “Toward Party Politics?: Kuwait's Islamic Constitutional Movement,” Carnegie 
Papers 79 (2007): 3-20; Paul Salem, “Kuwait: Politics in a Participatory Emirate,” Carnegie Paper, 
Carnegie Middle East Center 3 (2007 June): 1-19; Amr Hamzawy, “Deconstructing Islamist 
participation,” Al-Ahram Weekly Online 885, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2007/855/op11.htm 
(accessed 17 November 2009). 
2 Nathan J. Brown and Amr Hamzawy, Between Religion and Politics (Washington D. C.: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 2010); Marina Ottaway and Amr Hamzawy, Getting to 
Pluralism: Political Actors in the Arab World (Washington D. C.: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 2009). 
3 Shafeeq N. Ghabra, “Balancing State and Society: The Islamic Movement in Kuwait,” in 
Revolutionaries and Reformers: Contemporary Islamist Movements in the Middle East, ed. Barry 
Rubin (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003), 105-123. 
4 Brown and Hamzawy, Between Religion and Politics; Eugenio Dacrema, “New Emerging 
Balances in the Post-Arab Spring: the Muslim Brotherhood and the Gulf Monarchies,” ISPI Analysis 
155 (2013). 
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ICM in the 2008 and 2009 elections; nor its recovery in the February 2012 election. What 
these perspectives seem to lack is a consideration of relations within the opposition and 
the structural framework of competition, both of which point to pluralism in Kuwait. 
 
The ICM and its parent organisation, the Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood, are now 
rethinking how to participate in parliamentary politics. Considering this situation, this 
paper aims to explain the causal mechanisms behind the decline and revival of the ICM, 
focusing on changes in interparty competition. To discuss the effect of the Arab Spring, 
we need to clarify the factors and parameters that determine the outcome of elections for 
the ICM. 
 
2. Political participation of the Islamic Constitutional Movement 
 
The Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood, or “Islamic Guidance Society” (Jama‘iyyat al-Irshad 
al-Islamiyy), was established in 1952 by members of the educated urban middle class as 
a franchise of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. This later became known as the “Social 
Reform Society” (Jama‘iyyat al-Islah al-Ijtima‘iyy), and in 1963, it was registered with 
the Ministry of Social Affairs as a social organisation. 5  The Kuwaiti Muslim 
Brotherhood has participated in parliamentary elections since the first election was held 
in 1963, aiming for social Islamisation through the enforcement of Islamic law (Shari‘ah). 
In the 1970s, the Muslim Brotherhood had close ties with the government and clashed 
with Arab nationalists and communists.6 During the period of the first dissolution and 
suspension of parliament (1976–81), a member of the Muslim Brotherhood joined the 
government as a minister. In the 1981 election, the Muslim Brotherhood’s campaign 
platform was the revision of Article 2 of the Constitution to enshrine Islamic Shari‘ah as 
the highest source of law. After 1985, the Muslim Brotherhood clashed with the 
government. During the period of the second dissolution and suspension of parliament 
(1986–92), the Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood participated in the “Constitutional 
                                               
5 Falāḥ ‘Abdullāh al-Mudayris, Jamā‘at al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn fī al-Kuwayt, (al-Kuwayt: Dāral-
Qurṭās li-al-Nashr 1999). 
Ibid., 12–13. 
6 ‘Abdullāh Abbās Buwayr, Istijwāb fī al-Ḥukūmāt al-Kuwaitiyyah mundh 1963-2008, (al-Kuwayt, 
2008), 24. 
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Movement” (al-Harakah al-Dusturiyyah) in 1989, demanding the resumption of 
parliament and of constitutionalism. This campaign was led by the opposition leader and 
former speaker, Ahmad al-Sadoun, who supported a collegial system of factions and the 
formation of a government through the legislature.7  
 
Members of the Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood established the ICM as part of this system 
after the liberation of Kuwait from Iraqi occupation in March 1991. The ICM entered the 
arena ready for factional politics, and with an eye towards party politics. It focused on 
political activity and aimed at achieving social Islamisation by enforcing Shari‘ah law, 
all accomplished through the parliamentary system of the current Constitution and regime. 
The ICM emphasised consensus building with other factions and respect for the 
Constitution and the legislature. It has been characterised as a political party in terms of 
its rules and structure. For example, a committee of eight has final approval over 
membership; internal committees correspond to parliamentary committees; and there are 
restrictions regarding party debates about votes. Well organised, the ICM has broad but 
shallow support across the whole country. It has been penetrating organisations such as 
labour unions, co-op societies and student unions and recruiting members from these 
organisations.  
 
The ICM’s actual activities in parliament have been characterised by some opposition 
members as political betrayal. It cooperated with the government and accepted two 
ministerial seats in the cabinet at the beginning of the 1992 parliament. Soon after, 
however, the ICM clashed with the government over issues that included the revision of 
Article 2 of the Constitution, sex segregation at Kuwait University, women’s suffrage and 
political reform. The ICM held a leading position in the opposition, actively clashing with 
the government on many policies. During the 1999–2003 parliamentary term, the ICM 
led a nascent Islamic bloc, while simultaneously accepting a ministerial seat for a member 
who was not elected as an MP. Subsequently, leadership of the opposition and the Islamic 
bloc gradually shifted to prominent independents aligned with the Salafi Movement, who 
                                               
7 Mary Ann Tétreault, Stories of Democracy: Politics and Society in Contemporary Kuwait, (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2000). 
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were closely associated with their own clans and tribes. At the end of the 2003–2006 
parliamentary term, the ICM enthusiastically supported electoral reform and joined “Bloc 
29”, a coalition opposition bloc. However, Ismael al-Shatti, a member of the ICM, but 
not an MP, accepted the position of Minister of Communication. He was appointed 
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State for Affairs of the Council after the 2006 
election. This prompted a split within the membership, with the ICM declaring that he 
was not its representative in the cabinet. The ICM responded the same way when 
Mohammad al-Olaim, a member, but not an MP, was jointly appointed the Minister of 
Electricity and Water and the Minister of Oil in March 2007. During the 2006–2008 
parliamentary term, clashes between the government and the opposition reached a climax. 
Therefore, the ICM aroused mistrust both among members of the opposition and voters. 
 
It is usually understood in the Kuwaiti political context that the ICM was defeated in the 
elections of 2008 and 2009 because of indecisiveness. However, this view reflects a 
superficial understanding. We need to explore the structural factors beneath the surface 
to truly understand these events. 
 
3. The structure of interparty competition 
 
The Kuwaiti party system was quasi-institutionalised at the level of parliamentary blocs 
from 1999 to 2008. This party system is characterised by a three-level nested structure. 
The first level is the government and the opposition, the second level is political 
orientation (tayyār siyāsyy) within transformed parliamentary bloc (kutlat al-
barlamāniyya) and the third level is political association (tajammu‘ siyāsyy) of sect 
(tā’ifah), clan (ā’ilah) and tribe (qabīlah). 
 
The concept of a quasi-institutionalised party system considers a parliamentary bloc as a 
component of the party system. Although political parties have no legal status in Kuwait, 
they do have political associations. Some of them, such as the ICM, act as de facto parties 
in local contexts. However, these political associations hold few seats in parliament and 
are not appropriate units of analysis for a party system. By contrast, parliamentarians have 
enhanced their cohesion according to their political orientations. Since the Assembly of 
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1999, there have been three opposition blocs. These are: the Liberal group, later renamed 
the National Action Bloc (NAB) by secular liberals from urban areas; the Popular Action 
Bloc (PAB) formed by populists from newly developed areas; and the Islamic Bloc (ISB). 
Except for independent loyalist MPs, who are called ‘service deputies’, most MPs belong 
to blocs. We can find some characteristics of parliamentary parties in these blocs.  
 
We follow Giovanni Sarotori’s brief definition of ‘party’ and ‘party system’.8 However, 
we would like to examine the concepts of party system institutionalisation and the quasi-
institutionalised party system. According to Mainwaring and Scully, party system 
institutionalisation satisfies four conditions. First, it ensures the stability of rules and 
regularity in patterns of inter-party competition, as measured by Pedersen’s index of 
electoral volatility. Second, the major parties must have somewhat stable roots in society. 
Third, the major political actors accord legitimacy to the electoral process, and to parties. 
Fourth, in party organisation matters, political elites are loyal to their parties and party 
discipline in the legislature is reasonably strong.9  
 
Gwiazda categorises quasi-institutionalised party systems based on Mainwaring and 
Scully’s four conditions in order to elucidate examples of post-communist countries. She 
identifies three criteria: ‘stability of inter-party competition’, ‘high party discipline’, and 
‘structural stability’, and then defines a quasi-institutionalised party system as one that 
‘displays medium to high levels of institutionalization with regard to each criterion’.10 
Accordingly, here we use indicators such as Pedersen’s index for Laakso’s and 
Taagepera’s effective number of parties and Rae’s fragmentation index.11 Examining the 
case of Kuwait, we add the linkage between party and society because of its importance 
in this context. 
                                               
8 Giovanni Sartori, Parities and Party Systems: a Framework for Analysis, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1976), 44. 
9 S. Mainwaring and T. R. Scully eds., Building Democratic Institutions: Party System in Latin 
America, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 5. 
10 Anna Gwiazda, “Poland’s Quasi-Institutionalized Party System: the Importance of Elites and 
Institutions,” Perspectives on European Politics and Society 10/3 (2009): 353. 
11 Ibid., 354; M. Laakso and R. Taagepera, “Effective number of parties: A measure with application 
to Western Europe,” Comparative Political Studies 12, (1979), 3-8; D. Rae, The Political 
Consequences of Electoral Laws, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), 53. 
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It is useful to examine the Kuwaiti party system at the second level. The ICM and other 
prominent political associations in Kuwait are sometimes regarded as quasi-parties. We 
agree with this view, but treat them, here, as substantial organisations, because the 
associations are micro-parties comprising all MPs who belong to an association smaller 
than the sum of independents. From 1999 to 2008, interparty competition was stable 
among the parliamentary blocs, which exist at the second level, but the number of votes 
changed inside the ISB. We can see this shift among the ICM and other associations and 
independents. This shows us that the Kuwaiti party system can be explained by analysing 
the second level (see Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1: Laakso and Taagepera Index (LTI) based on seats of independents who support 
the government as one bloc 
1999 6.63 (3.75) 
2003 8.90 (3.89) 
2006 4.27 
 
 
Figure 2: Number of votes for each bloc 
 1999 2003 2006 2006* 
Islamic Bloc 50,898 51,358 112,948 48,228 
PAB 19,802 19,743 32,029 13,676 
LG/NAB 13,596 13,752 33,737 14,405 
Independent 
Bloc 
- - 52,718 22,529 
Voters 112,882 136,715 340,248**  
Turnout 81% 81% 67%  
* Referential numbers of male votes derived from the male to female ratio (m:f = 1:1.34) 
** Female suffrage enacted. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Percentage of seats (left column) and votes (right column) 
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 1999 2003 2006 Average 
Islamic Bloc 28.0 55.9 28.0 46.5 34.0 49.5 30.0 50.6 
PAB 20.0 21.7 12.0 17.9 16.0 14.0 16.0 17.9 
LG/NAB 18.0 14.9 12.0 12.3 16.0 14.8 15.3 14.0 
Independent 
Bloc 
    26.0 23.1   
 
 
Figure 4: Proportionate number of votes within the Islamic bloc  
 1999 2003 2006 2008 
ICM 19,907 15,940 19,154 28,220 
SIA 8,591 14,121 33,386 36,872 
Salafi 
Movement 
759 2,315 2,840  
Independent 21,641 18,982 57,568  
Total 50,898 51,358 112,948  
 
 
Analysing the competition among parliamentary blocs, we see that each bloc has 
maintained a stable number of votes (see Figure 2). This implies that every bloc has a 
stable support base. Secular liberals (LG), renamed NAB in 2006, and populists (PAB) 
have core constituencies on the basis of their strong personalities within specific non-
overlapping districts (munṭaqah). The ISB competes with NAB and PAB in urban districts, 
and with tribal representatives, who support the government, in outlying districts. 
Compared with other blocs, the ISB shows a significant gap between the percentage of 
seats won and the percentage of votes received (see Figure 3). This means that they have 
few seats relative to their share of votes, which is almost half of the votes nationwide. 
 
Inside the ISB, only ICM shows no change. However, the Salafi Islamic Alliance (SIA), 
which is more dogmatic and radical, has been receiving an increasing number of votes 
(see Figure 4). Remarkably, the ICM won a record six seats in the 2006 election, although 
the actual number of votes was the same as in 1999, despite women obtaining suffrage 
and voting for the first time in this election. The ICM did well, electorally, in cooperation 
with others and pared down its number of candidates in the 2006 election. This implies 
11 
that the ICM has cooperated effectively with other Islamist groups. MPs belonging to the 
ICM mainly come from outlying tribal districts, because in urban districts the ICM is 
losing in competition with Salafists (SIA and Salafi Movement). As previously mentioned, 
the ISB receives many ineffectual popular votes. It seems that this is a cause of the ICM’s 
weakness in urban areas. Therefore, the ICM supported electoral reforms that would 
reduce the number of wasted votes by merging electoral districts. 
 
4. The effects of the electoral reforms in 2006 
 
The electoral reforms of 2006 redrew Kuwait’s electoral districts and cut the number from 
25 to 5. The 25 districts of the old system were the result of gerrymandering implemented 
by royal order to ensure a majority for tribal representatives, who supported the 
government in 1980 during the first dissolution and suspension of parliament. Under the 
old system, every district had two seats and voters chose two candidates. This caused a 
disparity in the relative importance of single votes and encouraged vote buying in some 
districts. Opposition MPs criticised this situation and supported electoral reforms to 
reduce the vote-value disparity, vote buying and corruption, and influence peddling in 
small districts. Opposition MPs won electoral reforms after a difficult political contest 
during the first half of 2006. 
. 
In the new five-district system, every district has ten seats and each voter chooses four 
candidates. This system requires organisational strength, financial ability, or public 
popularity to win a seat. The ICM supported the new system enthusiastically, attempting 
to organise and transform the ISB into a parliamentary party, and to prepare a bill to 
legalise the party in accordance with the new system, thereby aiming for a large 
proportional representation system in the future. At the time, it seemed that the new 
system would favour the ICM because it was well-organised and had broad though 
shallow support throughout the country. 
 
Contrary to the expectations of observers and the ICM, the ISB was disorganised from 
the start because of the political activities of tribes pursuing their own interests and 
organisational modes. MPs who came from tribal districts organised themselves 
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according to tribal lineages. Each tribe formed an electoral list composed of four members 
and competed according to these lists. This system made it difficult for the ICM to obtain 
seats in tribal districts. The background factors behind the disarray were as follows. First, 
the large constituency system increased the value of the proportional vote, which 
increased the number of viable parties. Second, the incentives for Islamist MPs to unite 
within one bloc no longer existed. Islamist parties had lost many elements of their 
common agenda, such as their objections to suffrage for women and political reform. The 
parties agree on social Islamisation, but they disagree on the path to it. The loss of a 
common agenda highlights the difference between economic policies that benefit urban 
areas and those that benefit peripheral tribal areas. This difference is also a basis for social 
division in Kuwait between urban and peripheral tribal areas. MPs from peripheral 
constituencies resisted the leadership of urban MPs. Additionally, the ICM’s 
indecisiveness about supporting the government made it difficult for them to cooperate 
with other parties during the 2008 and 2009 elections. 
 
So far, we have seen that the outcome of the election for the ICM was determined by 
structural factors of inter-party competition. The ICM’s position was weak in electoral 
competitions for urban districts before electoral reforms took place in 2006, despite its 
origins in the urban middle class (see Figure 5). Candidates from the ICM have competed 
with those of many groups: not only secular-liberal and populist candidates, but also 
candidates from other Islamist groups such as the Islamic Salafi Alliance within the ISB 
(see Figure 6). Although its MPs mostly came from peripheral tribal districts, the ICM 
faced difficulty in obtaining support from tribal clans after the 2006 electoral reforms. 
 
In contrast to earlier years, the February 2012 election saw the revival of the ICM. 
Remarkably, the ICM won seats in urban districts, mainly because it succeeded in forming 
an opposition coalition and coordinating candidates and votes. Of course, the government 
corruption scandal and resulting public demonstrations spurred the opposition to include 
the ICM, but the basic structure of interparty competition did not change much before the 
February 2012 election. The election results indicate that the ICM adapted well in 
reforming its strategies and structure. From what has been mentioned above, we can 
tentatively conclude that a determining factor in the outcome of an election for the ICM 
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is whether it can form a coalition among opposition candidates and coordinate both 
candidates and votes. 
 
 
Figure 5: ICM candidates and winners from urban and tribal constituencies 
Election Candidates (urban /tribal) Winners (urban/tribal) 
1992 10（5／5） 4（2／2） 
1996 12（6／6） 5（1／3） 
1999 12（6／6） 4（1／3） 
2003 11（7／4） 2（1／1） 
2006 6（2／4） 6（2／4） 
 
   
Figure 6: Competing ICM and Salafis (SIA and Salafi Movement) constituencies 
Election Competing constituency 
urban/tribal 
Result for the ICM: 
win/lose 
1992 2／0 0／2 
1996 2／1 1／2（1win from tribal） 
1999 3／0 0／3 
2003 3／1 1／3（1win from tribal） 
2006 0／0  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Strategic adaptation and the impact of the Arab spring 
 
As a result of the elections in 2008 and 2009 after the electoral reforms, the ICM lost its 
seats and influence in parliament. Its defeat in the elections was a turning point for the 
ICM. Since ex-MP Nasser al-Sane assumed the position of secretary-general in 2009, the 
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ICM seems to have undertaken a comprehensive review and restructuring of its strategy. 
It stepped back and refrained from taking up a leadership role among the Islamist MPs. 
During the Assembly of 2009, three prominent independent Islamist MPs, who 
represented their tribes and were at the forefront of the opposition, unified and established 
the Development and Reform Bloc (DRB). The ICM became a subsidiary of DRB and 
was committed to supporting it. This means they took a more clearly adversarial stand 
against the government. This strategic change helped the ICM to take back seats in the 
election held in February 2012. They rode a wave of popularity based on the prominence 
of DRB members and public opinion during the Arab Spring. After the election, all of the 
elected members of the ICM joined the DRB. 
 
This strategic change and clearly adversarial stand against the government on the part of 
the ICM has been ongoing. During the Assembly of February 2012, when the opposition 
occupied a two-third majority, they called for amendments to the Constitution to limit the 
power of the ruling family and to enhance Islamic principles. The Assembly was 
dissolved by the order of the Constitutional Court which declared the election invalid. 
The emir then called a fresh election but ordered a change in the electoral law. The 
opposition, including the ICM and DRB, reacted sharply to these processes and decided 
to boycott the elections. They signed a pact among themselves to continue to boycott 
elections. The government has increased oppression of the opposition, especially the 
populists. While the ICM has avoided direct oppression, it has been forced to keep a low 
profile. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This paper has focused on the structural changes and collapse of bloc-based cooperation, 
triggered by the negative impacts of the electoral system. The lessons drawn from the 
consequences of electoral reform reveal the dilemma of institutionalisation: between a 
lack of reliability and the necessity for parliamentary life. The more the opposition 
remained in sharp conflict with the government, however, the more cohesive it became, 
re-forming parliamentary blocs during the Assembly of 2009. PAB was renewed and DRB 
was formed by prominent independent tribal Islamist MPs. The ICM joined after the 
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February 2012 election. This initiative by Islamist MPs to re-unify signified a changeover. 
 
In the case of Kuwait, while the activities of the local organisation of the Muslim 
Brotherhood were allowed, they were subject to indignities or forced to keep a low profile 
to survive. Political participation of the ICM in Kuwait seemed to offer a successful 
example of the Muslim Brotherhoods’ political participation before the time of the Arab 
Spring. However, they have now failed and withdrawn from the political process. They 
claim that they will return if the emir agrees to form a government of elected members in 
the parliament. However, they have no way of getting back to where they were before. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*This work is based on the research findings of IDE-JETRO research project in FY2013-
2014 entitled “The Society of the Muslim Brothers and International Linkage of Islamic 
Movements.” 
